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Abstract 
The historical progression of the idea of ‘Rights’ and ‘Citizenship’ are embedded in a narrative, which postures itself as a 
Universalist in nature. The role of ‘State’ in such a narrative account cannot be over-stressed. The concept of ‘Rights’ in such 
a context comes across as an act of dispensation. Dispensation of ‘Justice’, such an account and its discussion problematises 
the almost universally accepted notions regarding ‘Human Rights’. In order to do so, some of the major epistemological 
shifts are identified to analyze the ‘accepted’ continuum of human thought and behaviour which are universal in nature. It 
would be useful here to question the ‘universal’ tenor of this kind of exercise in modern social science theories where nature 
has been ‘pushed’ in to the periphery. The MDG envisioned, must overcome this academic and practical resistance to 
identify the crux of international relation.  
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1. Introduction 
The historical progression of the idea of ‘Rights’ and ‘Citizenship’ are embedded in a narrative that postures 
itself as Universalist in nature. The role of ‘State’ in such a narrative account cannot be over-stressed. Sometimes it 
performs as nation, primarily focusing upon identity, and sometimes in other stressing the importance of 
“deterritorialised discourses of human rights are increasingly coming to prevail in the post-Cold War era”i The 
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concept of ‘Rights’ in such a context comes across as an act of dispensation. Dispensation of ‘Justice’.ii The birth of 
modern ‘State’ in the ferment of Europe that the 18th century was, saw the coming together of this new institution 
and the notion of ‘Justice’. The dispensation followed. Interestingly enough, 17th century onwards was also the 
period when geographical ‘discoveries’iii and explorations made colonies in the Americas, Asia and Africa a part 
albeit an extension, of Europe. It will not be out of order here to comment on what this entailed in terms of 
developing ideas about the nature of progress; progress of humanity or the civilization that the humans created. Such 
an account and its discussion problematises the almost universally accepted notions regarding ‘Human Rights’. An 
essential exercise to say the least, absence of which does not reveal the notion in all its complexity. 
2. Discussion 
In the previous paragraph, we had referred to ‘State’ as a new institution arising in Europe during the post-
Renaissance period. It would be worthwhile here to introduce the Foucauldian idea of epistemic shifts. Late 18th 
century saw such a shift with respect to state. Analyzing the nature of power as exemplified by its location, Foucault 
saw a transformation from the earlier ‘sovereign power’ to the present ‘disciplinary power’. iv The former was 
located in the person of the absolutist monarch, while the later is located in the state, a modern phenomenon 
according to Foucault. The question that begs an answer here is what were the elements of power or its application 
that reflected such a shift. Characteristically the former tended to be brutal, involved torture, v  and physical 
punishment. It operated intermittently and was ritualized, imbued as it was with huge doses of symbolism. The 
exercise of such power almost always took place in public view.vi In contrast, ‘disciplinary power’ was and is 
associated with technologies of regulation, monitoring, and surveillance. By changing patterns of thought and 
behaviour through techniques of training it is able to operate continuously. Rationality takes over from ritual 
symbolism and application of power takes place within the cloistered walls of institutions.vii It is not our contention 
to accentuate the differences between the above-mentioned Foucauldian categories. Any social observer would 
recognize that both forms of power operate (and with some legitimacy to say the least) in contemporary times. 
Hence, the use of the word epistemic shift and not break. viii  Shift referring to positional movement within a 
discursiveix field even if extending the boundaries. Break on the other hand refers to complete disjuncture, a 
conscious act. 
We have been discussing the epistemic shift in the nature of power. ‘State’ emerged from such a movement as 
the legitimate (not the only one) repository of power. The act of constitution of the state comes, so to say, with 
another epistemic shift. We see the concurrent categorical shift from ‘subject’ to ‘citizen’. Without resorting to 
definitions as suggested by political theorists,x we would try to find their constitutive elements. ‘Subject’ refers to a 
member of a state owing allegiance to its monarch or supreme ruler.xi ‘Citizen’ on other hand refers to a legally 
recognized subject or national of a state or commonwealth.xii Even a cursory glance at the above definitions would 
push the question of agency (of the subject/citizen) to the forefront. While ‘owing allegiance’ imputes ‘agency’, 
‘legally recognized’ takes it away. It is in this context that the dispensation of justice was referred to. It goes without 
saying that one, if not the only, reason for the origin of the state, or structures of earlier times that resembled the 
modern state, was to deal with the issue of justice.xiii Along with justice comes its handmaiden, the concept of 
‘rights’. However, before delving into the nature of rights, (specifically human rights), it would not be out of place 
to briefly discuss about citizenship. Conventional and the generally accepted wisdom views citizenship as an 
entitlement that fruits of which are optimally utilized within a democratic set-up. Democracies with elections 
configure citizens as individuals. Individuals who can choose what the state needs to do with regards to her/his 
needs, expectations, and demands. In such a set-up, not only does a citizen become an (or another) individual but 
her/his rights also become individual ones. To bring Human Rights at this point into the discussion would be proper. 
“Human rights are rights held by individuals simply because they are part of the human species. They are rights 
shared equally by everyone regardless of sex, race, nationality, and economic backgrounds. They are universal in 
nature.xiv As the definition shows, group or community identities are subsumed within the individual IDENTITY. 
This subsumption leaves the modern states’ with problem that are difficult to steer clear of, as any Indian would 
surely be aware of. Another problem that one is left with is the hypothesis that rights, or as in our case human rights, 
are universal in nature. A strange situation where the individual becomes the unit, a condition not bad in itself, but 
loses his agency to act as such. The whole basis for her/his existence becomes the state, which posits itself as the 
universal agency of legitimation and storehouse of power.  
It would be useful here to question the ‘universal’ tenor, which we have referred to earlier in the opening section. 
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Being reflexive xv would also be advantageous for such an exercise. As can be seen quite clearly, the whole 
theoretical and ideational basis of this paper lies firmly in the Western philosophical tradition. xvi It is almost 
impossible for us, as students of social sciences, to look beyond the said tradition. This is because of two 
fundamental problems. Firstly, the terms or categories that we are dealing with here are firmly rooted in the 
historical specificity of the metropolitan West.xvii Secondly, the act of colonization has acted as crucial disjuncture 
for us who were colonized. An epistemic break so to say. The act of colonizing came along side the efflorescence of 
new knowledge. Knowledge about geography, society, history, polity, etc.xviii subsequently, this new knowledge was 
systematized and importantly institutionalized. Colonialxix institutions became sites for production, transfer, and 
storage of knowledge. Knowledge that helped in the building up of an understanding vis-à-vis the colonies as well 
as the metropolis.xx Sadly, for the colonies, the only ones.xxi This constituted and still constitutes a massive loss. 
Other knowledge systems became or were declared extinct. They started to be referred to as, traditional, pre-modern, 
barbaric, archaic, and so on. That modern social science theories are almost exclusively produced in the 
metropolitan West is a function of this colonial encounter. Omission of the knowledge regarding the colonial 
encounter and metropolitan theorizing has gone side by side. This theorizing has produced self-referential 
knowledge masquerading as reflecting the universal lived reality. Nevertheless, when knowledge is generated from 
such positions of privilege or power, ‘it is likely to serve hegemony not liberation’.xxii Moreover, what are rights but, 
in a sense, instruments of liberation. As Connell points out, “Intellectuals in the periphery cannot universalize a 
locally generated perspective because its locational specificity is immediately obvious.”xxiii Universalist aspirations 
of metropolitan theory are underwritten by the tacitness that it shows regarding its own locational specificity. xxiv 
Moreover, non-metropolitan intellectuals are hamstrung by the destruction, or at least the delegitimisation, of 
traditional forms and systems of knowledge. Operating in settings such as Colleges, Universities, Academies etc, 
designed to produce theories as their western contemporaries with categories that the metropole has provided us, the 
task of theorizing becomes a doubly difficult one. An almost Sisyphean one.xxv 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the UN talks of three basic categories of human rights: 
civil and political rights, social and economic rights, and cultural rights. A major part of contemporary discussion on 
human rights has revolved round the relative importance to be attached to the three categories of rights. Locational 
specificity as reflective of the particular trajectories of historical development with regards to the metropolis and the 
periphery have seen states placed in one or the other stressing on one category or the other. Different pathways mean 
different sets of socio-economic and political institutions as also distinctive normative cultural set-ups. But the 
‘peripheral’ areas of the world, as we know, were forcefully soldered to the metropolitan areas with consequent 
disastrous results. This forced integration came at the price of their becoming exploited junior partner in the ‘world-
system’.xxvi This has led to a curious situation where tradition and modernity exist side by side in the now free 
colonial states.xxvii Institutional set-ups of the state structure (itself of European origins) and the lived reality seem to 
go their own merry way.xxviii We, who reside in the periphery, should however stay clear from becoming or essaying 
the role of self-righteous victims. As application of the core-periphery model within a country like India would show 
that exploitation associated with colonialism occurs on a daily basis in the peripheries with the same catastrophic 
results.xxix Interpretation of data generated by the colonial encounter resulted in production of classificatory schemas 
with notions of hierarchy and evolution embedded in them. Development, whether cultural, social, political, etc, 
became a story of ascension from one type to another. This knowledge was hegemonic to say the least. Competition 
with its logical corollary confrontation becomes an almost impossible outcome to avoid. Production of knowledge 
remains with the façade of universality.  
3. Conclusion 
To take the argument further, it is not only that development becomes a progressive unilinear movement, but all 
change is talked about and discussed as such. Anthony Giddensxxx puts this point across succinctly, when he talks of 
‘tribal societies’ as closer to nature, therefore ‘cold’, and not ‘adapted to change’.xxxi Such a classification undercuts 
the need to understand, use, and empathize with the knowledge that such (in fact all peripheral societies) societies 
have generated and continue to generate. It is here that the question regarding human rights that we had posed earlier 
needs to be revisited. The evolutionary scheme generated by the metropolitan ‘universal’ theories is pervaded by 
ideas of anthropocentrism. Evolution from ‘lower to higher human types’xxxii (as also knowledge about and by them) 
is exemplified by the constant movement away from nature. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaimed 
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by the UN General Assembly resolution 217A (III) of 10th December 1948 marked an important step in the afore-
mentioned movement. To put the point across in not too subtle a way, it would behove one to observe that nature 
itself has been pushed into the periphery. This paper does not claim to be a theoretical exercise, but it tries to set 
forth the agenda for a future discussion on the issue of human rights. Deliberation concerning human rights cannot 
be in absence of a debate about the nature and the historical construction of categories such as ‘state’, ‘justice’, 
‘citizenship’ etc. Perhaps the way forward lies in trying to work away with the assumed distinction between nature 
and human, hierarchical categories that have enriched our knowledge as a species, but with disastrous consequences 
for the planet as whole and major sections of the resident human population. Works on comparative state formation 
have grown rapidly and become globalized in recent years, may be its time to include this sort of ‘immaterial’ factor 
while putting the baggage of experiential mode of inquiry into the hypothesis formation about the mapping of the 
nation-state, so that, finally we can settle for one. The post- Millennium Development Goal (MDG) 2015 is a step 
towards that effort, which tried to envision the sustainable development of the both, nature and human being. The 
spirit must be to achieve development without artifice or destruction of the nature upon whom the fate of the planet 
depends. The time has come to rectify our past/present mistakes regarding nature and its potential destructive 
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